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THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION
IN THE WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM
A SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS
ABSTRACT
We examine the effects of education on financial decision-making skills by identifying an
interesting source of variation in pertinent training. During the 1990s, an increasing number of
individuals were exposed to programs of financial education provided by their employers. If, as
some have argued, low saving frequently results from a failure to appreciate economic
vulnerabilities, then education of this form could prove to have a powerful effect on rates of
behavior. The current paper undertakes an analysis of these programs using a previously unexploited
survey of employers. We find that both participation in and contributions to voluntary savings plans
are significantly higher when employers offer retirement seminars. The effect is typically much
stronger for non-highly compensated employees than for highly compensated employees. The
frequency of seminars emerges as a particularly important correlate of behavior. We are unable to
detect any effects of written materials, such as newsletters and summary plan descriptions, regardless
















Since the early work of Becker ( 1967), economists studying the returns to education have traditiomlly
focused on the relation between education and wages. From the perspective of the associated literature,
education creates value by conferring skills that are of use to employers. Clearly, however, this is not tie
sole economic objective (It’education, In addition to labor market skills, education may also confer
decision mding skills. Apart from any affect on labor market performance, tiese decision making skills
may improve an individual’s ability to weigh alternatives, exploit opportunities, and achieve personal
objectives.
Some of the most complex decisions undertaken by ordinary individuals concern financial issues, such
as the determination of retirement income needs, or the allocation of resources among alternative
investments. Most individuals make these decisions on the basis of their own judgement, rather than with
the help of experts, in Iargt part because the market for financial expertise is imperfect (see Bernheim
1994a, 1996b), It is thertifore conceivable that appropriate forms of education may improve the quality of
personal tinancial decision-making.
Existing evidence cc)ncerning the relation between education and financial choices is quite limited.
Correlations between an individual’s general level of educational attainment and his or her rate of saving
have been documenttcl by Bernheim ancl Scholz (1993) and Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995).
However, as in the literature on returns to education in labor markets, these correlations may be
attributable to other related factors. For example, individuals with greater patience presumably tend to
remain in school longer, and to save at higher rates. As noted by those studying the relation between wage
and schooling (see e.g. Card, 1995), causal inferences about the effects of education are potentially
misleading unless they are derived from sources of variation in education that are plausibly exogenous.
One particularly pertinent source of variation in education concerns the availability of financial
education in the workplace, According to one recent survey, as of 1994, 88 percent of large employers
1offered some form of financial education, and more than two-thirds had added these programs after 1990. L
Typically, employers provide information and guidance on a range of topics related to retirement planning.
While nearly all such programs cover principles of asset allocation, sizable majorities treat retirement
income needs (73 percent) and retirement strategies (88 percent).g If, as argued by Bernheim (1994a,
1995a), low saving frequently results from a failure to appreciate economic vulnerabilities, then education
of this form could prove to have a powerful effect on rates of saving.
It is doubtful that the availability of employer-based retirement education is entirely unrelated to
workers’ underlying predispositions to save, However, there are a variety of reasons (discussed below) to
believe that employers adopt these programs as remedial measures in instances where employees are
disinclined to save. [f this is the case, then cross-sectional estimates of the relation between saving and
education may provide lower bounds on the causal effects of education. In addition, since many of these
programs have been adopted quite recently, it may be possible to control for an unobsemed predisposition
to save by contrasting the behavior of the same individuals before and after educatioml interventions.
In this paper, we study the behavioral effects of tinancial education in the workplace using survey
data collected from employers who sponsor pension plans, Our analysis is based in part on estimates of
the cross-sectional relations between various forms of education and plan activity. Since the data contain
repeated observations on many tirms, they also permit us to evaluate the direction of the probable bias in
cross-sectional estimatts by testing the hypothesis that educational is remedial (through an examination of
the circumstances under which programs are adopttd or expanded). Moreover, the Iongitudiml data allow
us to control explicitly for unobserved (firm-level) fixed effects.
Despite the growing importance of employer-based retirement education, existing evidence on this
“’Employeesgelting rnorc Investment education, planning help on the increase,” Pensions & Investn~ents, January 23,
1995, p. 74.
‘See Employee Benctit Rcse:lrch Ins[itute (1995, p. 15).
2topic is largely confined to qualitative surveys and case studies (see e.g. Employee Benefit Research
Institute, 1994, 1995, A. Foster Higgins & Co., Inc., 1994, Borleis and Wedell, 1994, or Geisel, 1995).
One exception is Bernheim and Garrett (1996), who use a novel household survey to study the effects of
these programs. Their analysis is complementary
these studies in greater depth below.
to the current paper; we discuss the relations between
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After describing our data (section 2), we
provide an analysis of the circumstances under which employers offer retirement education (section 3).
While certain kinds of education are more common at organizations that offer self-directed pension plans
(such as 401(k)s and 403(h) s), tven employers that offer defined benefit plans (and nothing else) frequently
provide some form of financial education, For 401(k) plans in particular, the data indicate that low
participation among non-highly compensated employees is a strong predictor of the adoption and/or
enhancement of educational offerings. At least in the context of 401(k) plans, education therefore appears
to be remedial, in the sense that it is macle available to those who are least inclined to save. In part, this
may be a consequence of’non-discrimination requirements, which limit contributions of highly
compensated employees as a function of contributions by non-highly compensated employees. Based on
this finding, one would expect cross-sectional estimates of the relation between participation (contributions)
and education to he biased against the conclusion that education enhances participation and contributions to
self-directed plans.
In section 4, we examine factors correlated with participation in and contributions to 401(k) plans.
We find that both measures of activity are significantly higher when employers offer retirement seminars.
The effect is much stronger for non-highly compensated employees than for highly compensated
employees. The frequency of seminars emerges as a particularly important correlate of behavior, We are
unable to detect any effects ot’ written materials, such as newsletters and summary plan description,
regardless of frequency. We obtain silmilar results based on longitudinal patterns, as well as for an
3assortment of estimation methods. In light of the likely bias mentioned in the previous paragraph and
discussed in more detail in section 3, these findings are strongly consistent with the efficacy of retirement
seminars, and they do not rule out the possibility that other forms of education are also effective.
In studying the relation between 401(k) activity and education, we control for a variety of plan
features. The effects of these features are, of course, of independent interest, and have been the subject of
several prior analyses (s~e Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1994, Papke, Petersen, and Poterba, 1993, Papke,
1995, Andrews, 1992, Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox, 1993, and Scott, 1994). Generally, we find that the
existence of an employee match is strongly related to 401(k) contributions, and especially to participation,
in cross-sections. However, this effect is not readily apparent in longitudinal data. There is relatively
little indication that any measure of 40 l(k) activity is significantly related to loan provisions. Investment
options have no detectable effect on participation, but contributions tend to be a bit higher when greater
flexibility is offered.
The paper CIOSLS with a brief conclusion.
2. Data
The data for our anal]sis come from the 1993 and 1994 versions of the KPA4G Peat Mat-wick
Reriremenf BeneJ/s .$~fmey, [n 1993. KPMG Peat Manvick selected approximately 1100 employers at
random from a list of all the prit’atc and public employers in the United States with at least 200 employees. If
they were willing to participa[c again, these same employers were retained for the 1994 survey. Any
employers }vho decl incd LOparticipate in 1994 w’ercreplaced with a randomly selected employer from the
same indust~, region, and emplo}er-size catego~.
In each year, these employers were questioned by telephone about the administration, features, and
employee utilization of their retirement plans. Some basic employer data, such as total employees, sales, and
industry, are a~ailablc for all respondents. In addition, those employers who have a retirement plan (910 in
41993 and 861 in 1994) provide some general information about their plan, including the number of
employees co~crcd b> the plan, [he t>pcs of plans offered, and the extent to which financial education and
guidance is provided by [he cmplo~cr to help employees invest for retirement. Furthermore, for each type of
retirement plan that a [Irm offers, the survey contains detailed questions about its features, eligibility
requirements, and emplo!”ec activity.
Those emplo}ers \\”hooffer401 (k) plans (596 in 1993 and 566 in 1994) report the features of their
plan, including the availability of an employer match, the matching rate provided, whether hardship
withdralvals and loans arc pcrmi[tcd, and lhc number and type of investment options available to a participant
in the plan, The sunc> also allo\\s us to determine \vhich employee groups, such as union, salaried, or part-
time employees. arc eligible to pafiicipate in the plan. In addition, participation and contribution rates are
provided for the cmplojccs eligible for the 40 l(k) plan, Thus, for a large sample of over 500 firms each year,
the survey pro~ides a rich set of plan characteristics and utilization rates. The variables that we focus on in
this study fall into Lhrcccatcgorics: basic firm characteristics (where the firm is the unit of analysis for the
study); general plan characteristics, cncompnssing all retirement plans offered by the firm; and 40 l(k) plan
characteristics.
With respect to the first catcgo~, \ve experimented with a number of basic firm characteristics
(including sales and dummy \ariablcs for indust~ and region), but generally found that they had very little
effect on our rcsul[s, For most of [he results presented in this paper, we have retained only one general firm
characteristic: the total number of cmplo!’ces,3
The second group of \ariablcs includes general features of the firm’s retirement programs. The most
important of these describe the extent to which the firm provides financial education to its employees,
Specifically, the survey asks each respondent ho\v often the firm provides summary plan descriptions,
employee nelvslettcrs or other periodic publications, investment seminars for all employees, seminars for
3Since the data \\’cre provided 10us ivithou[ film identities-s, we were limited to information collected by the survey.
5employees over age 50. and seminars for emplo~ees \vithin a year or two of retirement. Each respondent was
aslicd \vhcthcr the firm used lhcse dc~iccs of[cn, sometimes, rarely, or never. To incorporate the qualitative
nature of these responses into our analysis. \\e use these responses to create three dummy variables for each
educational dcvicc. The first indicates \vhcthcr the device is used often, the second indicates whether it is
used sometimes or rarely, and the third indicates it is never used. We combine the responses “sometimes”
and “rarely” because Lhedata have Iimitcd ability to identi~ educational parameters, and since the subjective
distinctions bet~veen these responses secm the most likely to differ across respondents.4
Other pertinent characteristics of an clmployer’s overall retirement program covered by the survey
include information on Lhccomposition of rc[ircmcnt plans (e.g. 40 l(k)s, defined benefit, profit sharing, and
so forth), and lhc fraction of cmplo!ccs who arc covcrcd by a retirement plan. Unfortunately, the smey
collects coverage information on a firm-\\idc basis, rather than plan-by-plan.
The final catego~ of \ariablcs includes characteristics of 40 l(k) plans.
for wrhelhcr loans arc pcrmiltcd and \\hclher an employer match is provided.
These include dummy variables
We also calculate a measure of
the number of diffcrcnl kinds of in~cslmcnt oplions (employer stock, guaranteed income contracts, equity
mutual funds, corporate bond funds. go~crnmcnt funds, and other funds) available to plan participants. Other
survey questions allo~vus to determine if certain employee groups, such as union, part-time, or salaried
employees, are eligible for the plans
For 40 l(k) plans. \vc construct participation and contribution rates for eligible employees. The survey
‘The results in (his paper do nol change quali(u(ively \vhen we use other groupings of the responses to these questions.
In ol-der to veril) (he I-obus(ness ot’our rcsLIIIsand to reduce SIIIIfullher the number of parameters, we also occasionally
define a single variahlc rncosunng [he intcnsi(y OFthe educational oilkring. The variable is set equal to 3 if the device is used
often, 2 if it is sometimes used, I if It is rarely used, and Oif it is never used.
‘The sm~’eyalso pl-o~’ides]nfc)lma(ion about other potentially usefil plan features, such as hardship withdrawals and the
actual matching l-ateprovided by the ti[m. Unfollunatelv the usefulness of these variables is diminished by data limitations
and w’ethel-efore do not include lhem in our specifications. For example, in each year of the survey over 94 percent of
employers allow ha]-dship liithdl-awals, so tbcre is no[ enough variation in (he data to examine their effect on plan activity.
Also, fewer than 40 percent of lhc employers ~vho oftkr an employer match report the actual matching rate. Therefore,
incorporating ~heactual l-ate in(o ouI-speciticztions \vould severely limit the sample size available for estimation.
6provides measures of 40 I(k) plan acli~ily for three categories of employees: all, highly compensated (HC),
and non-highly compcnsalcd (NHC). All eligible employees are classified as either HC or NHC according to
specific rules set forth ill the opplicablc non-discrlrnination provisions. These rules \vere Instituted to ensure
an equitable distribution of benefits from pension plans. In the context of 40 l(k)s, they operate by limiting
the amounts that highly compensated employees can contribute as a function of contributions by non-highly
compensated emplo>ccs. An individual is classified as highly compensated if he or she meets any of a
number of specific criteria (c,g. earnings of roughly $100,000 or more, ownership of more than 5 percent of
the company, or earnings of roughly $65,000 or more if this amount is in the top quintile of the firm’s salary
distribution). In addition to participation rates. [hc suncy also provides contribution rates as a percentage of
salary for plan participants. ~ Once agoin, these fig~lres are provided separately for all employees, HC
employees, and NHC employees. Taking Lhcproduct of participation rates and average contribution rates
conditional on parlicipalion, we obtain average contribution rates conditional on eligibility,
Summa~ statistics for 40 l(k) participation and contribution rates are provided in Table 1. Mean
participation rates arc sli.ghll! Icss than 60 percent for NHC employees, roughly 80 percent for HC
employees, and just over 60 pcrccnt o~crall in both 1993 and 1994. The distribution of participation rates for
HC employees is highl! slictvcd (\\ilh oullicrs on the lo\ver tail), causing the median participation rates to be
about 10 pcrcentogc points higher than [he mean rates. Participating employees generally contribute between
5 and 7 percent of their salaries, ~vithHC employees contributing approximately one percentage point more
than NHC employees. In both }cars. contribution rales for eligible employees averaged just under three
percent for NHC cmplo}ccs. o~er five pcrccnt for HC employees, and between three and four percent overall.
‘While the survey asks foI-the a~cl-age contribution as a percentage of compensation, it is not completely clear from the
wording whether it means the average OVCI- contl-ibutors, or the average over eligibles. The designers of (he survey suggest
the former is tic nahu-al intcl~retation, Given the data, this interpl-etation appears to be colTect. We calculated the average
contribution for companies that lrepolled pallicipation rates from Oto 25 percent, 25 to 50 percent, 50 to 75 percent, and
75 to 100 percent. There I\LISno evidence of systcm:~tic variation in contributions over these categories, If companies were
repolting the average o\’cI-eligibles, then dle a~’clagewould (as a purely mechanical matter) have to rise steeply across these
catego]-les.
73. The Availability of Retirement Education
As a first step in our anal>sis. we prolidc descriptive information concerning the availability of different
kinds of retirement cducalion in the \vorkplace. Overall, in 1993 nearly 74 percent of pension plan sponsors
provided summn~ plan descriptions, roughly 65 percent distributed newsletters, and just over 44 percent
offered rctircrnent scrninars LOall cmplo>ccs. When firms are weighted by total employment, summary plan
descriptions and nc~vslcttcrs appear to bc somc~vhat more common (roughly 80 percent in each case), but the
frequency of seminars is essentially unchanged (44 percent). The fraction of firms providing summary plan
description \vas some]tha[ lo\\cr in 1994 than in 1993, but the fractions providing newsletters and seminars
rose slightly.
Since our ullimatc objccti~c is to c~alualc Lherelation between education and behavior, it is important to
develop an understanding of [he sources of variation in educational offerings across firms. Plan sponsors are
presumably more Iikcly to pro\ide information when participants are required to make decisions. It is
therefore natural to spcculatc that [he growlh of educational offerings results in large part from the rising
populari~ of self-dircc[cd plans sLIchas 401 (k)s and 403(b)s (see EBRI, 1995, or the extended discussion in
section 3 of Bcmhcim and Garrett, 1996). Yet the KPMG Peat Mamvick smey data reveal that seminars,
newsletters, and surnman plan dcscrip[ions arc nearly as common among firms with defined benefit plans
(43,8 percent, 68.9 pcrccnt. and 73,1 percent, respectively for 1993) as among firm with 40 l(k)s (44.4
percent, 71.2 percent. and 80 I pcrccnt. respectively for 1993).
The preceding finding roiscs Lhcpossibility lhat many employers provide retirement education to
address general concerns aboul cmplo>ces’ preparation for retirement, rather than to equip them with plan-
spccific decision-making skills. One need not construe this as necessarily altruistic. Education may help
employees to appreciate Ihc values of lhcir pension plans. By promoting adequate preparation for retirement,
an employer may also hope to avoid subsequent conflicts (e.g. over demands for more generous pension
benefits) with older, poorly prepared ~vorkers. Assistance \vith financial plaming may also enhance employee
8loyalty, improve labor relations, and boost morale.
Of course, comparisons based on ra~vfrcqucncics, such as those described above, maybe misleading,
For example, it is common for empto~ers to offer both a defined benefit plan and a supplemental 401(k), It is
therefore possible thnt the frequency of cducaliona! offerings at organizations with defined benefit plans in
part reflects the prcscncc of sccondav 401(k) plans. Also, it is conceivable that educational offerings may
differ systematically by company characteristics that are related to the presence of defined benefit plan.
To investigate this possibility, we estimate probit models explaining the availability of seminars for all
employees, seminars for cmplo>fees over 50 years of age, seminars for employees nearing retirement,
summa~ plan descriptions. and ncljslctlcrs or periodicals. Results are contained in table 2. Explanatory
variables include variables measuring the l!pcs and varie~ of plans (where the omitted catego~ is “only a
defined bcnefil plan-’), cmplo!mcnt. plan co~cragc, and year. The data are pooled across years, and the
standard errors arc corrcctcd to account for potential correlation across obsemations from the same
organization.
Focusing attcn[ion on organizations \vith a single plan, it is evident that seminars of all kinds are most
common among non-profit institutions \\iLh 403(b)s. Companies with 40 l(k)s are more likely to offer
seminars to all emplo~”ccs thnn companies iiith defined benefit or other kinds of plans, but less likely to offer
seminars specifically for older cmplo>ccs. Written materials of all kinds are most commonly used among
companies with 401 (k)s. but there are no significant differences between the likelihoods that sponsors of
other kinds of plans pro~idc such materials. Thus. \vhilc the rising popularity of self-directed plans may have
promoted the groi~lh of ccrtoin Educational offerings, the impetus for this growth appears to be much more
general. This is consistent w“iththe findings of Bcmhcim and Garrett (1996).
Table 2 also indicates that educational offerings are significantly more common among organization
with multiple plans. Emplo\’ment and coverage are positively correlated with seminar offerings, but not with
the availability of ]*TiLtcnmaterials. This may reflect the presence of economies of scale in the provision of
9seminars. Generally, the f’rcqucncies ofcducational offerings did not change appreciably between 1993 and
1994.
When analyzing the relation bctwccn education and behavior, we must necessarily restrict attention to
organizations wilh plans Lha(permit cmplo>ces to make choices. We therefore focus our attention on
401(k)s. Since Lhcdeterminants of education offerings relate to the selection process determining the
incidence of “treatment,” it is important to reexamine the determinants of these offerings specifically in the
context of 40 l(k)s. If, for example, education tends to be offered in response to a demand for information by
employees who are naturally inclined to save at high rates, then positive cross-sectional correlations between
education and 401 (k) ac[i~’it}could rctlcct selection, rather than the influence of employer-based education on
employee behavior. If, on [hc other hand. companies tend to provide education as a remedial measure to
employees \Fho arc o[hcm\isc disinclined to save, then the nature of selection could obscure an underlying
relation bclwccn education and bcha~ior.
Analogously to lablc 2. table 3 provides estimates of probit models explaining the availability of various
educational offerings in the pooled 1993/94 sample, In this instance, however, we have confined attention to
companies i~ith 40 I(!i)s. Wc ha~’cOISO added sc~cral nc!v explanato~ variables, including the number of
categories of invcstmcn[ options (e.g. cmplo!er stock, guaranteed income contracts, bond funds, equity
mutual funds, and so forth) atailablc to participants. and dummy variables indicating whether the plan covers
union employees,” \vhcthcr it provides for an employer match, and whether loans are permitted.
As in table 2, seminars for older workers are more Iikcly when companies offer plans other than
40 I(k)s, and the likelihood of seminar offerings generally tends to rise with employment. Notably, education
does not appear to be more common among plans [hat cover union employees. Since employees presumably
have greater Ic\erage iihen the! are unionized. this casts doubt on the hypothesis that education is provided
‘Unfortunately, this val-iable is not available for defined benefit plans, and therefore could not be Included in the
recessions of table 2.
10in response to emplo>ce demand. [t is also notable that the correlation between seminars and employer
matching provisions is ncgati~c (though not siyificant at conventional levels). This is consistent with the
view that education and matching are substitutable methods of encouraging participation in situations where
employees sho~~-insufficient interest in [hc plan. Not surprisingly, education of all forms is si~ificantly more
likely when employers offer participants more int-cslment options. There is also some indication that
seminars and loan provisions are positively correlated.
Thus far, we ha}e not exploited the longitudinal features of our data. Doing so permits us to examine
the circumstances under \\hich employers establish or expand educational offerings. Specifically, we regress
the change in seminar offerings bet~tecn 1993 and 1994 on a variety of “initial” (1993) company and pension
plan characteristics. For the purpose of [his analysis, we measure the change in seminar offerings as the
difference bct\\ccn the ‘-intcnsit}” of seminars (measured on a scale of Oto 3) in 1993 and 1994 (see footnote
4),
Results appear in table 4. Separate results are presented for each of our five educational categories.
The most striking feature of this [able is the pattern of negative coefficients for the initial participation rate of
NHC employees in [hc spcci Iicotions explaining changes in seminar offerings. In the case of seminars for all
employees, the cocflicicnt is highl! significant: it is marginally significant (i.e. with slightly less than 95°/0
cent’idencc) for lhc other t\\o seminar variables. This implies that low participation among NHC employees
is strongly associated \\]th subsequent increases in employer-sponsored seminars. This result does not,
however, carry over to \vrillcn materials. No other variable consistently passes tests for statistical
significance at con~’entional ICVCIS.The coefficients of the initial HC participation rate are also negative for
the seminar variables. but their magnitudes and levels of si~ificance are smaller. With low confidence, the
estimates indicate that cducotiona] improvements were more likely among fu-ms with pensions plans that
covered larger fractions of employees. Improvements in age-specific seminars were also less common among
larger firms and among unionized firms, There is little if any relation between initial pension plan
11characteristics and subsequent changes In educational offerings.
The paltem documcnlcd in table 4 supporLs the h~~othesis that, in the context of 40 l(k)s, retirement
seminars are remedial. These offerings appear to be motivated by low participation among NHC employees.
This is consistent Iiith Lhcview that non-discrimination requirements provide a powerful impetus for the
provision of retirement cducalion among 401 (k) sponsors, However, it is doubtful that this is the only
motivation. If it \vcrc. lhcn high Initial HC participation would also correlate with subsequent increases in
education, which is not (I1ccase, The small negatit’c effect of initial HC participation probably reflects the
offsetting effects of two separate considerations: first, that employers are inclined to offer education as a
remedial measure \\hcn 40 I(k) activit? is loii- (regardless of HC or NHC status), and second, that employers
also use education LOaddress binding non-discrimination constraints (which tend to arise when HC
participation is high). These findings arc consistent \vith the indirect evidence on selection offered by
Bemhcim and Garrett ( 1995),
4. Evidence on Participation in and Contributions to 401(k) Plans
In this section \vc use (hc KPMG Peat Manvick plan-level data to examine factors associated with
participation in and contributions 1040 l(k) plans. We use cross-sectional data on all the firms in our sample
and also examine changes for the same firm over 1993 and 1994. While we focus on the role employer-based
education plays in these dccislons, \vc cxfiminc several other plan and firm characteristics that may be related
to participation and contributions.
A. Factors affecting participation in self-directed plans
The first step in our anal>sis of401 (k) activity is to examine cross-sectional OLS regressions of plan-
Ievel participation rates. Since there arc sirong similarities between the data for 1993 and 1994, and since we
are not interested in in~cstigatin.g an! specific hypotheses about the differences between these years, we pool
the t~vosumeys. We include a year dummy to account for any systematic factors that might influence
12participation or Conlribulions diffcrcn[l: through lime As in the previous section, pooling the data raises one
important empirical issue: since nlan> of the same fimls were surveyed in both years, it is doubtful that the
error terms are indcpcndcnt across all observations. While OLS estimates are still consistent under these
conditions, the conkenlional mclhod of computing standard errors is inapplicable. In our reported estimates,
we again correct our standard errors to rcllect clustered sampling.
Since nondiscrimination rules arc binding for many employers (Garrett, 1996), education programs may
be designed to encourngc participation b! NHC employees. Moreover, since HC and NHC households start
out with different levels of financial sophistication, we would expect financial education to affect their
behavior diffcrcnlly. For both reasons, Ire estimate separate regressions for these groups as well as for the
combined sample.
Results arc con(aincd in lhc first panel of table 5. The dependent variables for these regressions – the
plan participation rates – va~ [rem I to 100 pcrccnt. The estimated effects of the key explanatory variables
are described beloiv.
i, The role oJseminor.s
For our base-case cstlmatcs. \ve usc dummy variables to measure the intensity (frequency) of
educational offerings. In this ~vn~.wc a~oid imposing assumptions on the fmctional relation between
participation and an arbitrarily scaled rncasurc of education (as discussed in section 2, we do, however, use
the same dummy variable 10represent the responses “sometimes” and “rarely”). In subsection D, we also
present results based on a single scalar measure of educational intensity. We also focus exclusively on
seminars for all employees, rather than on seminars targeted at employees over 50 or employees near
retirement. In practice. Lheseminar variables are highly colinear, and it is difficult to identi~ their separate
effects ~vith precision.
Reading ncross [he firsl [\vo ro\\s of ihc first panel of Table 5, it is apparent that frequent seminars have
a consistently positive and significant cffccl on participation in self-directed plans. For non-highly
13compensated employees, frequent seminars arc associated \vith participation rates that me 11.5 percentage
points higher than plans ~vithno seminars. The corresponding figure for highly compensated employees is
6.4 percentage points. TIICSCare economically large estimates given mean participation rates – 60 to 80
percent – in the sample. The occasional seminar indicator variable is, however, insignificant in each
specification.
The results in tnblc 5 may obscure lhe relation between education and participation among HC
employees. Although censoring at Lhcplan Ic\el (at either Opercent or 100 percent) is relatively rare for “all”
employees and for NHC clmployees. it is much more common for HC employees, Specifically, for 32 percent
of the sample, the HC participation ralc is 100 percent. Obviously, increases in seminars and changes in
other plan characteristics cannot be associated with higher participation rates for companies that achieve 100
percent HC participation. Wc investigate Lheeffects of censoring in section D, below, where \ve estimate
Tobit specifications.
These results arc consistent \\-ith the h>pothcsis that seminars stimulate 40 l(k) participation generally,
and especially among NHC cmplo!ecs This implies that retirement seminars may be an effective response to
non-discrimination rules. Ho\\cvcr, there is no indication in the pooled results that seminars matter unless
they are conducted frcqucntl}.
ii: Other Jtirtns ofedlicall<)n ond in[ormotion dissemination
We include sclcral additional cdl]cation \ariables (newsletters and summary plan descriptions) to
examine \vhcthcr all educational and inromlational efforts are equally effective. Summa~ plan descriptions
typically amount to disclosure of plan characteristics, and contain very little (if any) recognizable education,
While it is perhaps conceivable that employees \vould be unwilling to trust (and therefore to participate in)
their pension plans ~vithout disclosure, tvc \\ould nevertheless be surprised if the use of these materials had a
measurable effects on plan acti~il>. [n contrast, nclvsletters often serve the same function as seminars, but
provide infomlation throllgh printed, rather that audio-visual media, According to a survey by the Employee
14Benefit Research Institute. 92 pcrccntof401 (k) participants say that they read these materials, and 33
percent say that thcj con~ributc more [o Lhcirplans as a result. One might therefore expect newsletters to
have an effect on behavior similar to thal of seminars, Altcmativcly, individuals may exaggerate their
responses to nc\vslcttcrs
“appropriate response, ”
in response to survey questions, particularly if they perceive this to be the
Notably, in the regressions of table 5. aside from seminors, no other medium of providing information
and education to emplo!ccs – either through nclvslcttcrs or summary plan descriptions – has any significant
association with participation rates. This is consistent }vith the hypothesis that these media have no effect on
participation. In principle. selection bias could mask a behavioral response. However, in contrast to
seminars, there is little indication in lhc results o[scction 3 that the provision of written materials is
motivated by low participation.
iii, I)Ion chclrocterlstics
There is mixed c~idcnce in LhcIitcraturc on the effect of matching rates on participation in self-directed
plans, despite the fact that matching is ]cn common. According to a 1990 Hewitt and Associates survey,
percent of 944 major US. corporations matched employee contributions. Papke (1995) finds a strong,
positive relationship bct]tccn match rates and participation in cross-sectional regressions using data from
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Form 5500,s The cffccl disappears in hcr prcfcrrcd, fixed effects specification, Andrews (1992) uses data
from the Current Population Sune\ and finds a positive relationship between the presence of a match and
participation ralcs. KLISkO.Po~crba. and Wilcox ( 1994) examine data from a single firm over several years,
where the match rate \aricd rrom Oto 139 percent of employee contributions (up to six percent of salary).
They found little varialion in participation ralcs across years, \vhich lead them to conclude that their results
suggest “a relatively small elasticity of participation with respect to the match rate, and cast substantial doubt
8Folm 5500 is filed annuollywi[h (I1cIRS by all sponso]s of pension plans wilh more [ban 100 participants. The data
include plan eligibility, pal~lcip:ltion, emplol!mcnt, administrative cost, distributions, and contributions.
15on the view that emplo}cr matching is a Iicy factor in explaining the rapid expansion of 40 l(k) plans. ”
However, the 401 (k) sponsored by Lhefirm examined by Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox was part of a profit-
sharing plan, and hcncc had unusuatly \olatile mntch rates It is not clear that one can generalize from
participation responses in profit-sharing plans to more common plan types, where match rates change much
less frequently. In principal, we expect matching rates to exert a positive effect on participation since they
provide a pure substitution effect at the extensive margin,
In all the cross-sectional recessions wc have examined, there is a positive and significant correlation
between the exis[cncc ofa match find participation. 9 The regression results in table 5 imply that plans with
matches have participolion rates [hat arc 14.6 to 16.9 percentage points higher than plans without matches,
Loan provisions alloi( families to borrow against contributions made to the self-directed plan.
Conventional reasoning suggests that eligible w’orkers will be more likely to participate in plans with loan
provisions since they \\”illha}e access to funds in the event they need to borrow. An alternative view holds
that loan provisions \\”illbe ncgati~c]y correlated \vith participation because they exacerbate “self-control”
problems \\illl saving (SCCc.g, ShclTrin and Thalcr, 1988). We find that the correlation between the existence
of loan provisions and participation arc positive but insiqificant in the regressions for all employees, and
negative but insignificant in the separale regressions for HC or NHC employees.
Having a broad range of investment options presumably increases the attractiveness of participation,
The number of options in these plans is not particularly large, with a mean of 2.8 in 1993 and a mean of 3.7
in 1994, A single investment option can bc narrow (say stock in the employee’s company, or a guaranteed
life insurance contracts), or broad. like the Fidelih familyof mutual finds, Although we expect investment
options to be positively correlated \vith participation, this effect is not significant in any specification.
Conceivably, (his finding may be attributable to the coarseness of our measure for the number of options
%ecall fi-omsection 2, (hatdaltion lhe Icvclofmtltch is missing for a large number of observations so we use only an
indicator variable [or whc[her [hc liml tll~crsa mntch.
16(e.g., the vast family of Fidelity equi~ mutual funds \vould be considered one option).
iv. Firm chorocterlstics
An obvious concern ~vithcross-scclionol estimates of the kind considered here is that the variables of
interest may bc corrclntcd \vilh unobserved lirm-spccitic characteristic. In that case, the correlations that we
attribute to seminars may in ffict reflect other factors. In addition to the plan characteristics already
mentioned, we thcrcforc include a set of firm-specific variables to try to account for other pertinent factors.
The existcncc ofothcr pension plans should matter for two distinct reasons. First, other pension plans
may be positi~el? correlated Ivi[h participation in a self-directed plan. There is extensive evidence that the
existence of a 40 l(k) is posi Li\cl! correlated \\ith employees’ tastes for saving (Engen, Gale, and Scholz,
1995; and Bcrnhcim 1996a). It is likely that the same is true for other pensions. Thus, the presence of
pensions may be positi]cly correlated \\itll participation in self-directed plans. Second, other pension plans
may reduce the likelihood of participation in a self-directed plan because the pension may provide households
with sufficient rctircmcnt sa~ing.
As \vould bc cxpcctcd i[ pcnslons and self-dircctcd plans are initiated in response to employees’ wishes,
participation rates arc higher in self-dircctcd plans \vhen the sponsoring firms offers at least one other
pension plan, The effect for all employees is significant at conventional levels.
There may bc systematic differences in self-directed plan offerings depending on the size of the firm,
and on the number of cmplo!’ccs co~.ered b!’ the plan. These differences might, for example, arise from
economies of scale in plan administration. or from correlations between size and other variables, such as plan
age, unobserved dimensions of plan gcnerosih, or the nature of peer goup effects, We include the number
of employees in the firm to capture variations in participation that may be associated with firm size, and the
fraction of employees covered to capture variations in participation that maybe related to plan size. We find
that firm size is nega[ivcll associated \\-ilh participation, but that participation rises significantly with the
fraction of emplo>ees co~crcd.
17The unionization indicator variable is consistently insignificant across specifications.
v. Sllmrnoty
In pooled cross-scclional rc.gressions. there are a number of factors that are significantly associated with
participation, inc]uding match rates and certain characteristics of the company. The effect of frequent
seminars is economical]> Iargc, positi~c, slatisticall}’ significfint. No other educational variable significantly
affects participation. [n light of the sclcclion issue documented in section 3, there is reason to believe that
these estimates understate the behavioral impact of retirement seminars, but may accurately reflect the impact
of\\Tittcn matcrinls.
B. Factors related to contributions in self-directed plans
As indicated in table 1. the sunc~ COIICCIS information on average contribution rates for plan
participants, Multiplying the aicrage contribution rate times the participation rate gives the average
contribution rate across all eligibles. We use this as our dependent variable to examine contributions.
Because the data arc aggregated across plans, (here is no obvious way to use information on the fraction of
nonparticipants and lIIc conditional mean among participants separately without making strong ad hoc
assumptions on the data. Since the conditional mean among participants is of limited intrinsic interest, we
therefore use the transfom~cd contribution variable.
Obviously, our contributions variable may inherit some of the properties of our participation variable.
Even so, there is no compelling reason (o expect. p priori, that contributions will vaty with education in the
same way as participation. To scc Ivh>. consider the follo~ving example. Suppose a firm’s employees differ
in lheir taste for sa~in.g Those \\ith a high taste ~villparticipate in self-directed plans when available and,
due to the tax subsidy (and possibly employer match), devote a relatively high fraction of sala~ to these
plans. Employees \\ith low tastes for saving \vill choose not to contribute. Now suppose frequent seminars
induce employees \vith lo\v tastes for sa~ing to contribute, If they contribute at low levels, the mean
contribution, conditional on participation, may actually fall, unless education also encourages high savers to
18save even more. It is conceivable. ho~lc~cr, that education might actually reduce saving among those \vho
- “’too much” relati~c to standard rules of thumb. Thus, even the unconditional would othenvise put atva~
mean of the contribution ra[c might fall \\ith education
As is clear from the second pnncl of Table 5, the frequent seminar variable is positively and significantly
associated \vith contributions for lhc regressions involving all employees and non-highly compensated
employees. The cffccl is quite Iargc. Mean (unconditional) contribution rates are around 3.4 percent of
salary, so the estimates imply that contributions are nearly 20 percent larger in firms offering frequent
seminars. This result is consistent \\ilh the hypothesis that retirement education – and frequent seminars in
particular – positivcl! affect (I1csize of contributions to self-directed plans.
In the specification for fill cmplo!ccs. bo[h match rates and loan provisions are positively and
significantly associntcd ~iith contribution rates. Larger firms have lo~vercontribution rates (the effect is
significant for highl!-compensated cmplo}ecs). The larger the fraction of employees covered by a self-
directcd plan, the higher arc contribution ra[es (the effect is si~iticant for non-highly compensated
employees and the all cmp]oyccs specification).
C. Longitudinal evidence on participation and contributions
The specifications displa>cd in table 5 use pooled data from 1993 and 1994. To control for spurious
factors that might generate an apparent cross-sectional relationship bet~veen seminars and participation or
contributions, \ve included a number of plan- and firm-specific variables. Nevertheless, a skeptical reader
might question these rcsul[s on the grounds lhat seminars are correlated \vith other firm-specific
characteristics, such as lhc dcyce of interest management takes in their employees, and that these other
characteristics arc responsible for lhc obscned correlation \vith behavior (perhaps through plan generosity,
\vhich is only impcrfcctl} accounted for in our specification).
As discussed earlier. \vc ha~e observations in both years for nearly 300 firms, Thus, it is possible to
repeat our analysis, diffcrcncing Lhcdata for our short (2-year) panel. While differencing removes time-
19invariant plan-specific characteristics, it also exacerbates any measurement error problems that might be
present, making it more difficult to estimate correlations that arise from behavioral relationships.
The first panel oflablc 6 examines participation, repeating the same specification as sho~~nin table 5,
but using the firsl-diffcrcnccd data. Allhough the statistical si~ificance of the results is not quite as striking,
this is probably to be cxpcclcd because lhc sample size is considerably smaller and because of the problems
arising from diffcrcncing short panels. Nevertheless, we find that instituting seminars on a frequent basis is
associated with a 7,7 pcrccnlagc point increase in participation rates, and the effect is significant at the 11
percent level for the all-employee sample. For non-highly compensated employees, the effect is 12.1
percentage points. and it is significant nt the 7 pcrccnt level. It is worth noting that the estimated effects of
occasional seminars appear s~rongcr in the diffcrcnccd estimates. Indeed, the effects of frequent and
occasional seminars no~~appear 10be roughly proportional.
We ~icw this as fllrthcr support for the h}vothcsis that retirement education – and frequent seminars in
particular - influence lhc saving bchalior of employees. Naturally, we cannot resolve the question of
causality \vith onl~ t~~-o !cars of daln: it is. for example, conceivable that employees might agitate for
seminars once Lhc}start participating (though it is doubtful that their employer would respond over such a
short lime frame).
Our resulls on match rates follo\v [he pattern observed in the literature. Although we find that match
rates appear to ha~c a strong, posilive correlation ~vithparticipation and contributions in cross-sectional data,
the effect disappears \vhcn one follo\vs the same firms over time. Because actual changes in match rates are
infrequent, it is possible that “obscmcd” changes arc dominated by measurement errors, in which case the
panel estimates of Lhcmatching effect maybe highly misleading. Satisfactory resolution of the role played by
matching on participation in self-directed plans requires better data, In general, very few other variables are
si~ificant in Lheparticipation rate specifications (and none are significant in the highly-compensated
20group) .’”
The second panel of Table 6 examines contributions, repeating the same specification as shown in Table
5, but using the first-diffcrcnccd dala, The frequent seminar variable is again significant for the non-highly
compensated group, and it is marginall} significant in the specification for all employees. The only other
significant cocfticicnts (al contcnlional Ic\cls) are the occasional seminar variable (for HC employees) and
the unionization variable (for all cmploJccs and HC employees).
D. Robustness
The resull.s prcscntcd in the previous sections depict a strong correlation between frequent seminars and
401 (k) activit>, cspcciali! nmong NHC cmplo}ces. In order to verify the robustness of these results we
examine the scnsitivit! of our results to a different method for measuring the intensity of education. We also
employ several alternate cs[inlation tcchniqucs: median, robust, and Tobit regression.
In the pret’ious section. there \verc ccL-taincases (most notably difference specifications for
participation) \~hcre the effects of frequent seminars were only marginally significant. This may occur, at
least in part, bccausc !JCarc asking the data to identify too many parameters. In these same cases, the point
estimates for Lhecffccls of occasional seminars arc roughly half of the corresponding point estimates for the
effects of frcqucnl seminars (SCClnblc 6). 11is therefore natural to consider an alternate specification based
on a scalar measure of educational intensity that allows us to summarize the effects of education through a
single parameter. Tnstcrid ofconslnlcting dummy \’ariables based on the frequency of educational offerings,
we simply measure frequency on a scale of zero to three, depending on whether education is offered never,
rarely, sometimes, or of[cn. This specification forces the effects of an increase in the frequency of education
to be the same \\hcn mo~ing from each qualitative response to the next. That is, it assumes that an increase
‘~n table 6, the occasional pl-o~ision of summaly plan descriptions appears to have a positive and si~ificant effect on
participation, Ho\\eveI-, this I-csultis apparently driven by outliers; it vanishes when more robust estimation techniques are
applied (as in the next section).
21from never to rarely has the same c[fcct on participation and contribution rates as an increase from rarely to
sometimes or sometimes to oflcn. While restrictive. it is more parsimonious than our original procedure, and
is generally not rejected by the data.
We estimate median and robust regression models to reduce the potential influence of outlying
observations.’ 1 The slandard errors reported for the median and robust recessions (as well as for the Tobit
estimates) using the pooled data arc not adjusted for the fact that the same firm may appear in the pooled
sample t\vice. As the standard errors ivcrc similar \vith and without this correction in the OLS specifications
sho~vn in Table 5, we do not vieiv this as a major shortcoming.
We use Tobit regressions to account for right and left censoring of participation rates at Oand 100
percent. While censoring occurs in the data for all three employee categories, it is particularly prevalent for
HC cmployccs. In the pooled dala. Ihc participation rate equals 100 percent for all employees in 29 of 1027
obsewations and for NHC cmplo!ccs in 27 obscmations out of 805. For HC employees this number jumps
to 267 of 824 obscnatiolls, or approximatcl: 30 percent of the sample. Left-censored observation (i.e., those
for \vhich the participation rate is Opcrccnt) arc not nearly as prevalent. There are no such observations for
all employees and NHC cmplo}ccs, and OIIIJ 12 cases for HC employees, We estimate Tobit models only for
participation rates using pooled cross-sectional data. While censoring is also present in the difference
versions of these models. ns \\ell as in models for contribution rates (both because of the censoring of
participation and bccausc of limits on contributions), the Tobit model is inappropriate in these contexts.
We report the cocflicienls of Lhescminnr variables for these alternate specifications in Table 7 and
Table 8. We omit the coefficients of other explanatory variables to conserve space. Each of these
spccihcations employs the same additional covariates as the earlier OLS recessions; results
covariates arc similar LOLhosc reported in ptcvious subsections and are available on request.
for these other
1lMedi,an repression accomlllishcs [his by minimizing the sum of the absolute values of the residuals rather than the sum
of squal-ed residuals. Robust I-cp-ession iil-st eliminates gloss outliers and then perfoms Huber iterations followed by
biweight iterations in orctel-to ~fc]ght obscnations more evenly in the loss function.
22i, An alternative tneosure oj-senlinar \ntens]ly
For even specification contained in tables 5, 6, 7, and 8, we present results based on an analogous
specification in ~vhich lie usc a single scalar measure of educational intensity, as described at the outset of
this section. The rcsulling cocfllcicnts for seminars arc presented in tables 7 and 8 under columns labeled
“intensity.”
Generally spenklng. for spccilications involving pooled (as opposed to difference) data, the magnitudes
and statistical precision of educational effects are similar to the results obtained using separate dummies for
frequent and occasional seminars. Ho\\cver, the usc of the seminar intensity variable sharpens the estimates
considerably for (he diffcrcnced data.
participation rates). the cocflicicnt on
For example, in the first column of table 6 (which concerns
frequent seminars for NHC employees is only significant at the 7
percent level. Ho\vc\cr. its magnitude is also roughly twice that of the occasional seminar variable, which
suggests that LISC of (I1cinicnsit> vnriablc ma! be appropriate. Indeed, as indicated in the first column of
table 7, the cstlmnlcd cocflicicnt for [hc intcnsil}’ variable in an analogous specification is statistically
significant at lhc 1
for all employees.
pcrccnt Ic\cl. A similar obscnalion applies to difference estimates of participation rates
[n general. \\-ith diffcrcnccd data, the effects of seminars on participation (table 7) and
contributions (table 8) arc found to be significant at a higher level of confidence when a single measure of
educational intensity- is used.
ii. Median and roh IIst regression. robustne.~s of participation results
We present median and robust regression results for participation in the middle sections of Table 7. In
many respects, these results are qualitative}’ similar to the OLS estimates. In the pooled data, the coefficient
on frequent seminars for NHC emplojccs drops from 11.5 in the OLS specification to 9.9 in the median and
11.2 in the robust regression. Ho\\c\er. both of [hese coefficients remain significant at the 1 percent level.
The coefficients of occasional seminars for NHC employees rise relative to OLS, but still fail to achieve
statistical significance at confcntional levels. There is no indication that seminars – even frequent ones –
23have a signiiicfint impact on Lhcporticipalion rates of HC employees. It is therefore possible that the effects
of frequent seminars on HC cmplo!’ccs measured in OLS recessions (as well as in the Tobit recessions
reported later) reflect lhe inllucncc of oulliers. For HC employees, the unexpected negative coefficient (from
OLS) on occasional seminars is reduced to a number much closer to zero in both the median and robust
recessions. Finally, the effect of frcqucnl seminars on participation rates for all employees is a bit weaker in
median regession and robust regressions than for OLS; hoivcver, the effect of occasional seminars, though
still smaller than the cf(cct or ~rcqucnt seminars. no~vachieves conventional levels of statistical si~ificance.
For the diffcrcnccd data. both the median and robust recessions reduce the size of the coefficients for
frequent seminars. but also incrcasc the precision \vith l~hich they are measured. The coefficient on frequent
seminars for NHC cmplo!ecs drops from 121 in the OLS specification to 7.4 in the median and 8.6 in the
robust regression. Ho\\c\cr. \\hilc the OLS coefficient ~vasonly significant at the 7 percent level, the median
regression cocflicicnt ISsignificant at lIIc 2 percent Ievcl and the robust regression at the 5 percent level.
Notably, \vhilc the cf[cct of occasional seminars on NHC participation was not significant in OLS estimates
with differcnced data. it is significant (and substantial) in both median and robust regression estimates.
Median and robust re~cssions also ~icld more prccisc coefficients for HC employees. For the median
reg~ession in particular, (IICcffccl is statistically significant, even though its magnitude is small. We suspect
that this result is attributnblc to the nature of the distribution of the difference HC participation rates. Many
of the participation ra(cs for HC crnplo~ccs arc at or near 100 percent for both 1993 and 1994; consequently,
more than 30 percent of the firms in the sample cxpcricnce no change in the measured participation rate of
HC employees between 1993 and 1994. Since the median change is zero, and since there are so many zeros,
it is not surprising that our explanato~ variables are found to have very little effect on the median, or that this
finding is precise. The cffcci of frequent seminars on participation rates disappears in the median and robust
regression estimates of the diffcrcnccd specification for all employees; however, the impact of occasional
seminars emerges as signi ticant. Final I!, as noted earlier the use of the intensity variable also enhances the
24statistical signilicancc of Lhc cdllcalional effect on NHC participation rates in both the median and robust
regession cstimntcs thnt Make usc or dlffcrcnced dala.
iii. Median and robust regression: robustness of the contribution results
The median and robust regression results for contribution rates appear in Table 8. The top panel
contains results for regressions fvith pooled data. The results for the robust regressions are qualitatively
similar to the earlier OLS estimation. ~vith a slight drop in the coefficients on frequent seminars. For
example, in the specification for NHC cmplo~ccs, this coefficient drops from 0.81 to 0.69. The statistical
significance of the cstimotcs is colmparablc to Lhatof the OLS coefficients, with the coefficient on frequent
seminars for NHC cmployccs remaining significant at the 1 percent significance level. The effect of
occasional seminars is also sla[islicall} significant in the specification for all employees. In contrast, the
median rcg~cssion results for contribution rates are \\-eakcr than the OLS and robust regression results. While
the signs 0[ the cocfficicnis arc [hc same. mnglliiudcs are generally Io\ver, and no single seminar dummy
achicvcs statistical signi ficancc al conl’cnlional Ic\rcls. Ho\vevcr, the seminar intensity variables approaches
statistical signi ficancc al the 95 pcrccnl confidence level in the specifications for NHC and all employees.
The bottom panel of table 8 presents median and robust regression results for contribution rates using
difference data. The effect of frequent seminars on NHC contribution rates is still reasonably strong, and
similar to that obtained using OLS. None of the olhcr seminar dummies depicted in this Io\ver panel achieves
statistical signi ficancc, The estimated effect of frequent seminars on the HC contribution rate is actually
ncgati~e and fairly Iargc in magnitude. but not vc~ precise. Ho\vever, as \vith the previous specifications,
\vhcn the seminar intcnsit> variable is used. median and robust regression estimates of the seminar effect for
NHC employees are similar in magnitude to the OLS results and statistically significant at the usual levels of
confidence.
iv. Tobii regression re,slllls
Tobit results for rates or participation appear in the last section of Table 7. The coefficients for both
25frequent and occasional seminars increase in size (relative to OLS) for all three employee groups. The most
tiamatic change occurs in the coefficient for frequent seminars for HC employees, which increases from 6.4
to 10,5. This result is nol surprising gi~cn lhc fact that more than 30 percent of the HC observations are
right-censored, Although precision is somclfhat lower for the Tobit estimates than for OLS, the coefficient
of frequent seminars for NHC employees remains significant at the 1 percent level, and the coefficient for HC
employees remains significant at the 5 pcrccnt Icvcl. These results suggest that censoring causes a downward
bias in the OLS cocfficicnts, and that HC and NHC employees respond to education more similarly than the
OLS results appear to indicate. Again, using the seminar intensity variable results in more precisely
estimated effects.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, \vc ha~c cxnmincd Lhceffects of employer-based retirement education on 40 l(k) activity
using finm-level data. Ollr rcsulls indicntc [Ilo[ rclircment seminars are generally associated with si~ificantly
higher rates of participnlion and contributions. at Icast when the frequency of these offerings is high. The
effect appears to be particularly slrong for non-highly compensated employees. Our findings reflect both
cross-sectional and longitudinal pattcms in the data, and they are robust with respect to a variety of
estimation techniques.
The current paper is complcmcnton’ to Bcmheim and Garrett (1996) who use household survey data to
investigate the effects O(education on total saving, both inside and outside of pension plans. However, since
their data are cross-sectional, the} are forced to make indirect inferences concerning the probable direction of
biases that might result from the inevitable failure to control for unobserved individual effects. With
household sumcy data, it is also difficult to distinguish bct~veen the effects of education on behavior, and the
effects of education on [hc \\ay that indi~’idua]s report behavior. In contrast, the employer survey data used
here allow us LOexamine bolh cross-sectional and longitudinal patterns; moreover, there is relatively little risk
26that the education ofemplo!ccs ~vould affect the }vaylhat employers report rates of participation and
contributions. The tradeoff. ofcoursc. is that cmplo!’er sumey data provide no information on assets held
outside of pension plans, ond thcrcforc do not permit us to investigate \vhether increased participation and
contributions reflect nc~t saving, rather Lhanasset reshuffling.
Taken together, [he current paper and that of Bcmheim and Garrett ( 1996) suggest that financial
education in the \vorkplacc con exert a strong influence on personal financial decisions. More generally, these
studies raise the possibility [hat lhc cnhanccmcnt ofdccision-making skills (as opposed to labor market
skills) may conslilutc a sigllificnnt economic rctum to education.
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29Table 1: Mean and Medinn 401 (k) Ptirticipatif)n and Contribution Rates
Employment-Weighted



























































































Source: Derived from KPMG Peat Marwick’s Retirenienr BeneJts in tile 1990s: 1993 and 1994 Survey Da[a.Table 2: me Effect of Retirenlent Plun Type on Educatiort - All Companies
Dependent Variable
Seminars Seminars for Seminars for Summary Newsletters or
for All Employees Employees Plan Periodicals
Employees Over 50 Near Retirement Descriptions



















































































N 1778 1773 1773 1771 1778
*Coefficients for Total Employment are multiplied by 10s.
Excluded Variable is Only Defined Benetits Plan.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Derived from KPMG Peat Marwick’s Retirenlent BeneJrs in tile 19WS: 1993 and 1994 Survey Data.Table 3: me Effect of RetireInent Pl:]n Type on Education - Companies with 401(k) Plans
Dependent Variable
Seminars Seminars for Seminars for Summary Newsletters or
for All Employees Employees Plan Periodicals















































































































N 1170 1169 1170
*Coefficients for Total Employment are multiplied by 103; coefficients for 1994 Dummy are
multiplied by 104.
Excluded Variable is Only 40 l(k) Plan.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Derived from KPMG Peat Marwick’s Renrenzenr Benejrs in r}le 1990s: 1993 ad 1994 Suwey Data.TahIe 4: Predictors of Changes in Ed(lcatinn
Dependent Variable
Seminars Seminars for Seminars for Summary Newsletters or
for All Employees Employees Plan Periodicals










































































































































*Coefficients for Total Employment are multiplied by 10s.
All dependen[ variables are first difference.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Derived from KPMG Peat Marwick’s Retirertlent Bene$ts in the 1990s: 1993 and 1994 Survey Data.Table 5: OLS ResulLs for Ptirticiputinn tind Contribution Rutes
Dependent Variable
Participtition Rates Contribution Rates

















































































































































































































*Coefficients for Total Employment are multiplied by 104 in the participation specifications, and 105in the
contribution specifications.
Huber standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Derived from KPMG Peat Marwick’s Rerirenlenr Bene$ts in tile 1990s: 1993 and 1994 Survey Data.Table 6: OLS ReslllL$ for Changes in Ptirticiptiti{ln und Contribution Rates
Dependent Variable
Participation Rates Contribution Rates




































































































































































































*Coefhcients for Total Employment are multiplied by 104.
All variables, both dependent and independent, are first difference.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Derived from KPMG Petit Marwick’s Retirenlenr Benefits in tile 1990s: 1993 and 1994 Survey Data..Table 8: Robustness of Ct)ntrihution Results
OLS Median Regression Robust Regression
Intensity Often S/R Intensity Often S/R Intensity
pooled:
NHC 0.211 0.475 0.186 0.155 0.690 0.192 0.169
(.080) (.363) (.219) (,084) (.254) (.. 153) (.070)
HC 0.115 0.119 0.118 0.068 0.316 0.225 0.121
(,119) (.405) (.247) (.075) (.389) (.231) (.106)
All 0.198 0.484 0.249 0.124 0.487 0.261 0.163
(,066) (.319) (.192) (.063) (.224) (.135) (.061)
NHC 0.407 0.929 0.206 0.201 0.824 0.242 0.263
(.153) (.506) (.338) (.084) (.426) (.285) (.123)
HC 0.219 -0.837 0.011 -0.084 -0.518 0.663 -0.090
(.242) (.490) (,338) (,110) (.684) (.478) (.202)
All 0.194 0.248 0.038 0.105 0.265 0.113 0.113
(, 104) (.268) (.181) (.105) (.303) (.204) (.091)
Each entry is the coefficient on Semintirs for that sl]ecitication of the model
The abbreviation SIR indicates the Sometimes-Rarely Semintir variable,
Standard errors are in l>arentheses
Source: Derived from KPMG Peat Marwick’s Retitenlenr Benejits in tlze 1990s: 1993 and 1994 Survey Data,